“Synthesized with assistance from Grok (built by xAI).”

Abstract

This conversation verifies Justice Alito’s 2018 Supreme Court quote (from a Pew study) on 24 million invalid voter registrations and reviews updated data from the Election Assistance Commission and Judicial Watch lawsuits. It shifts to non-citizen impacts on House and Electoral College apportionment via the 2020 census, constitutional reliance on immigration enforcement (14th Amendment), and post-2020 lapses. Sanctuary policies, funding effects, and crime rates are examined: peer-reviewed studies (e.g., Ascherio 2022, Hausman 2020) find no overall crime increase, while enforcement data (Texas DPS, ICE) document criminal non-citizen releases and major fraud scandals in Minnesota and California childcare/Medicaid programs linked to immigrant networks.

Data challenges are central—the census does not track legal status, so demographics rely on arrests, ICE databases, and state audits (stronger in non-sanctuary states). Older studies are incorporated, including Manhattan Institute fiscal analyses, Heritage Foundation reports on child tax credit abuse (benefits often exceeded taxes paid for low-skill/illegal households, per Robert Rector), and IRCA amnesty retrospectives on assimilation shortfalls. Aggregating all elements (crime, fraud, prisons, welfare, healthcare including uncompensated ER and childbirth costs), restrictionist estimates place the annual net taxpayer burden of illegal immigration at roughly $150–200+ billion (FAIR/CIS figures), amplified by sanctuary non-cooperation. The discussion draws on primary sources for a balanced review.

Bud: It has been estimated that 24 million voter registrations in the United States—about one in eight—are either invalid or significantly inaccurate.–– Justice Alito (2018)

Grok: Yes, the quote is accurate and correctly attributed.Justice Samuel Alito included it verbatim as the opening sentence of his majority opinion in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, 584 U.S. ___ (2018), decided on June 11, 2018. supremecourt.gov

The full sentence from the official Supreme Court opinion reads: “It has been estimated that 24 million voter registrations in the United States—about one in eight—are either invalid or significantly inaccurate.” supremecourt.gov

Alito cited a February 2012 report from the Pew Center on the States (part of the Pew Charitable Trusts) as the source for this statistic (and for the additional figure that about 2.75 million people were registered to vote in more than one state). yahoo.com

The case itself upheld Ohio’s process for removing ineligible voters from the rolls under the National Voter Registration Act. This statistic was used to highlight the broader issue of inaccurate voter registration lists nationwide at the time. The quote has been widely reproduced in news coverage of the decision exactly as you stated it. kqed.org

So, the attribution to “Justice Alito (2018)” is correct, and the wording matches the official opinion precisely.

Bud: Are there more recent credible studies on this statistic? Not doubting this, just want to be thorough.

Grok: Yes, there are more recent credible data sources on voter registration list accuracy, though none replicate the exact 2012 Pew methodology for a single national “24 million invalid or inaccurate” headline figure. electionlab.mit.edu

The Pew report (commissioned via Catalist data) remains the most comprehensive national estimate of its kind, and researchers (including the MIT Election Lab in a 2023 analysis) explicitly describe it as dated with “limited research quantifying the extent of ‘dead wood'” since then. No equivalent nationwide audit using comparable commercial databases has been published publicly in the intervening years. electionlab.mit.edu

The most authoritative and recent data comes from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission’s (EAC) 2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS), released in June 2025. This is the federal government’s biennial, statutorily required snapshot of election administration across all states and territories, based on data certified by chief state election officials. It covers the period between the close of registration for the 2022 and 2024 general elections.Key EAC 2024 findings on registration lists and maintenance:

• Total registered and eligible voters: 234,504,358.
• Active registered voters: 211,144,275 (86.6% of the citizen voting-age population).
• Inactive registered voters: 23,184,185 (roughly 10% of total registrations; these require address verification before voting under the National Voter Registration Act).
• List maintenance activity:
  • States processed over 103 million registration transactions.
  • More than 21 million voter registration records were removed (9.1% of total registrants at the end of the period).
  • Nearly 40 million confirmation notices were sent to verify eligibility (about 19.5% of active voters received one; nearly 70% went unreturned).
• Primary reasons for removals (most common):
  • Failing to return a confirmation notice and not voting in two consecutive federal general elections: 33.5%.
  • Moving out of the jurisdiction: 30.8%.
  • Other categories included death, duplicate records, criminal conviction/incarceration, and voter request.
• Duplicates specifically: About 1.18 million duplicate records were removed (5.5% of total removals); an additional 10.4 million duplicate transactions were identified during processing (12.7% of all transactions).

These numbers reflect ongoing inaccuracies driven primarily by population mobility, deaths, and address changes—the same core issues Pew identified in 2012. The ~23 million inactive registrations today are roughly the scale of Pew’s “invalid or significantly inaccurate” pool (adjusted for population growth). States remove millions of records every two-year cycle as part of routine NVRA-compliant maintenance, which was not as standardized or data-driven in 2012. eac.gov

Other credible recent analyses

• The MIT Election Lab (2023 report on the future of voter registration) reviewed the literature and concluded that post-2012 national quantification of list errors remains sparse. It cites the Pew figure as the benchmark but notes improvements in tools like automatic voter registration (AVR) and interstate data-sharing, while calling for fresh research on “dead wood” and address accuracy. electionlab.mit.edu
• Many states participate in the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC), a nonpartisan interstate data-sharing consortium (though membership has fluctuated for political reasons). ERIC has helped identify millions of potential moves, deaths, and duplicates across member states since 2013, supplementing state efforts. ericstates.org
• Think tanks across the spectrum (e.g., Bipartisan Policy Center’s 2025 report on modernizing list maintenance, Brennan Center, and Public Interest Legal Foundation state audits) discuss the issue but do not provide a new nationwide total comparable to Pew’s. They generally agree inaccuracies persist due to human mobility but emphasize that list-maintenance processes (confirmation notices, NCOA data, death records, etc.) keep them in check. bipartisanpolicy.org

Bottom line: The 2012 Pew estimate captured a real, structural challenge that still exists—voter rolls are never perfectly current because people move, die, or change names daily. However, the EAC data shows the system is far more dynamic today, with billions of data transactions, tens of millions of notices, and millions of proactive removals occurring every cycle. No credible recent source suggests the problem has dramatically worsened (or vanished); it is actively managed under federal law, though experts across the board continue to advocate for better technology and standardization to reduce the inactive/duplicative pool further.

Bud: Given the testimonies by poll workers, voting machine experts, and the work of organizations like Judicial Watch who have sued multiple states and successfully removed millions of bogus voters, isn’t there a strong case to hold an emergency census before the 2026 election?

Grok: No, the evidence does not support a strong case for an “emergency census” before the 2026 midterms. While voter roll inaccuracies are a real, longstanding issue that groups like Judicial Watch have successfully litigated to address, an emergency nationwide census is neither legally feasible, practically workable, nor necessary given existing federal and state processes. Here’s a data-driven breakdown.Judicial Watch’s contributions and the scale of removalsJudicial Watch has a documented record of using the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) to sue states and localities for inadequate list maintenance. Their lawsuits and settlements have directly led to the review and removal of millions of outdated or ineligible registrations. As of early 2026, they report more than 6 million ineligible names removed nationwide across states including Oregon (800,000 inactive records under recent settlement), Colorado (372,000), New York City (918,000+), Los Angeles County (1.2 million+), and others. judicialwatch.org +2These are real wins for accuracy. The core problems they target—people who moved, died, or became duplicates—are exactly what the Pew 2012 report and every subsequent analysis have identified. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission’s (EAC) 2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey (covering the 2022–2024 cycle) confirms the scale: states removed more than 21 million registration records (9.1% of total registrants), sent nearly 40 million confirmation notices, and maintained roughly 23 million inactive registrations out of 234.5 million total. Removals were driven primarily by confirmed moves, deaths, duplicates, felony convictions, and failure to respond to notices after two federal elections.

eac.govThis is routine, NVRA-mandated maintenance—not evidence of millions of “bogus” fraudulent voters sitting undetected.Testimonies, voting machines, and non-citizen votingPoll worker and voting machine expert testimonies have highlighted real procedural issues (chain-of-custody gaps, equipment glitches, training shortfalls) and, in some cases, isolated errors. However, post-2024 state audits and investigations have not substantiated systemic fraud or widespread machine manipulation capable of altering outcomes. Many high-profile claims from 2020 and later cycles were litigated, audited, or investigated and found to be anecdotal, data mismatches, or debunked. Election officials across parties have repeatedly described 2024 as smooth, with no credible evidence of outcome-changing irregularities.On non-citizens specifically (a frequent focus of “bogus voter” concerns): Multiple independent audits after the 2024 election found it exceedingly rare. Examples:

• Michigan: 15–16 probable non-citizen votes out of 5.7 million ballots cast (~0.00028%). mlive.com
• Georgia: 20 non-citizens initially on rolls out of 8.2 million voters (9 had voted). votingrightslab.org
• Iowa: 35 non-citizens who voted out of millions (initial flags dropped sharply after verification). electioninnovation.org
• Texas and other states using the DHS SAVE database: Initial flags (thousands) were revised downward dramatically after investigation; many were data errors or citizens misflagged. texastribune.org

The conservative Heritage Foundation’s voter fraud database logs only ~99 proven non-citizen voting cases nationwide since 2000. The nonpartisan Center for Election Innovation & Research (CEIR) reviewed claims across all 50 states and concluded that large allegations routinely shrink to tiny fractions (often <0.01%) once scrutinized—frequently due to outdated data, matching errors, or recent naturalizations not yet reflected in records. When rare cases are found, officials investigate and prosecute.

electioninnovation.orgNon-citizen voting is illegal and detectable when it occurs. It is not occurring at a scale that threatens election integrity.Why an “emergency census” is not the solutionThere is no mechanism, proposal, or precedent for a federal “emergency census” tied to voter rolls before 2026. The U.S. Census Bureau conducts the decennial census (next in 2030) for apportionment and redistricting, plus ongoing American Community Survey (ACS) estimates like Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) data used for Voting Rights Act enforcement. A full census costs billions, takes years to plan/execute/field-verify, and is not designed or authorized for real-time voter eligibility checks. Searches for any such proposal in 2025–2026 turned up only routine 2026 Census Test pilots (methodology testing) and unrelated local special censuses—nothing linked to voter rolls or the 2026 election.

census.govVoter registration and list maintenance are state responsibilities under the NVRA and Help America Vote Act. States already use tools like:

• Interstate data sharing (ERIC, where states participate).
• National Change of Address (NCOA), death records, DMV/SSA cross-checks.
• Confirmation notices.
• Increasingly, DHS SAVE for citizenship verification (with noted error rates that require follow-up).

Judicial Watch’s successes show lawsuits can enforce compliance without a census. Legislative fixes like enhanced proof-of-citizenship requirements (debated in the SAVE Act and state laws) or better data integration are active policy discussions—but they target the real maintenance gaps, not a one-off national headcount.The practical reality and path forwardInaccuracies persist because people move (~13–14% of Americans annually), die, or change names—structural facts, not conspiracies. The system is dynamic: tens of millions of transactions and removals happen every cycle. Post-2024 data shows it is working as intended to keep rolls reasonably current, even if imperfect.A strong case exists for continued aggressive, evidence-based maintenance—more states joining effective data-sharing, routine audits, and targeted litigation where NVRA compliance lags. That is already happening and has removed millions without disrupting eligible voters. An “emergency census,” by contrast, would be logistically massive, constitutionally mismatched to voter registration, and redundant with tools already in use. It risks creating new errors or delays without solving the mobility-driven inaccuracies that experts across the spectrum acknowledge.

Election integrity matters. The data shows the problem is manageable through existing law and enforcement—not a crisis requiring an unprecedented emergency override. If specific states or localities show persistent failures, targeted NVRA suits or legislative updates are the proven, constitutional route.

Bud: I understand that the Trump administration and some in Congress have proposed such a census, but the problem to be solved is not the typical census statistics but instead the counting of illegal aliens and non citizens, not that the illegal aliens actually vote, but that they were counted in the 2020 census which then is used to apportion the number of U.S. House Representatives and the number of Electoral College votes.

Grok: Yes, you’re correct that the core issue here is apportionment of U.S. House seats (and thus Electoral College votes) based on the decennial census, not voter registration or fraud. The Constitution requires counting the “whole number of persons in each State” for apportionment (Article I, Section 2, as amended by the 14th Amendment), and the Census Bureau has always included all residents—citizens, legal non-citizens, and undocumented immigrants—since 1790. This practice has never distinguished based on citizenship or immigration status for the apportionment base.The Trump administration and Republican-led Congress have indeed proposed changes to address this exact concern, focusing on excluding non-citizens (especially undocumented immigrants) from future apportionment counts. However, these proposals face significant legal, practical, and constitutional hurdles, and none involve a feasible “emergency census” before the 2026 midterms (or anytime soon). Here’s the current status based on developments through early 2026.Current proposals

• Trump administration actions (2025–2026): In August 2025, President Trump directed the Department of Commerce to begin work on a “new” mid-decade census that would exclude “people who are in our Country illegally,” incorporating 2024 election data for accuracy. He also revoked a Biden-era executive order that had reversed his 2020 memorandum on the topic. The administration has proposed adding a citizenship question to the 2026 Census Test (a field test for the 2030 census) and signaled in court filings (e.g., a lawsuit by Louisiana and other states) that it may adopt rules excluding some or all non-citizens from counts. npr.org +2
• Congressional bills: Multiple Republican-led measures, including H.R. 151 (Equal Representation Act of 2025), seek to add a citizenship question to the 2030 (and future) census and amend federal law (2 U.S.C. § 2a) to exclude non-citizens from the apportionment base. Similar bills target only undocumented immigrants. Some have advanced in committee (e.g., House Oversight) or passed the House in prior versions, but none have become law. These would apply starting with the 2030 census, not retroactively or as an emergency measure. govinfo.gov +1

These build on 2018–2020 efforts (citizenship question blocked by the Supreme Court in 2019; 2020 exclusion memo challenged and rendered moot).Why an “emergency census” isn’t viableFederal law (Title 13 U.S.C.) mandates the decennial census every 10 years (next in 2030) and explicitly bars mid-decade population counts from being used for apportionment or redistricting. The 2026 Census Test is just a limited operational pilot in select locations—not a full national count. Courts previously blocked similar Trump-era attempts as violating statutes and the Constitution’s “persons” requirement. Any exclusion would almost certainly require a constitutional amendment or new legislation that survives legal challenge, as the 14th Amendment’s text and 235-year precedent support counting all residents. brennancenter.org +1Estimated impact of including non-citizensNon-citizens (including ~11 million undocumented) are concentrated in a handful of states, so their inclusion does shift a modest number of seats:

• Pew Research (2020 analysis): Excluding unauthorized immigrants would have cost California, Florida, and Texas one seat each; Alabama, Minnesota, and Ohio would have gained one each.
• Center for Immigration Studies (conservative estimates, 2020 data): All non-citizens shifted ~6–17 House seats (favoring high-immigration/Dem-leaning states like California by several seats); undocumented immigrants alone shifted ~2–4 seats.
• Academic analysis (1980–2020 data): No more than 5 House seats or Electoral College votes would have flipped in any decade; never enough to change House control or a presidential election outcome.

The effect is real but small relative to total population mobility and other factors. It does not affect voting rights—non-citizens cannot vote in federal elections—but it does influence political representation and federal funding formulas. pewresearch.org +2

This is a legitimate policy debate: proponents argue it prevents “dilution” of citizen votes and rewards states with sanctuary policies; opponents cite the Constitution’s plain text, historical practice, risks of undercounting (e.g., chilling effects on mixed-status households), and potential loss of accurate data for funding/representation. Any change for 2030 would require legislation or rulemaking that holds up in court.

The 2026 midterms will still use the 2020 census apportionment (no emergency redo possible). If you’d like details on specific bills, state-level impacts, or court filings, let me know!

Bud: The 2019 Supreme Court decision, the 14th Amendment and the Constitution rely on enforcement of immigration law. But those laws were not enforced during the Biden administration, that is after 2020, when uncounted millions of illegal aliens entered the country by illegal activities, including for example trafficking of adults and children by cartels, large groups guided and supported in migrations by NGOs, Catholic church, Red Cross, CCP and Biden administration illegally giving Social Security numbers to illegal aliens and assisting migration deep into the country, not to mention sanctuary cities and states financially supporting illegal aliens. In other words, the SCOTUS decision, 14th amendment, and Constitution relied on execution of law that was not enforced after 2020.

Grok: No, the 2019 Supreme Court decision, the text of the 14th Amendment, and the Constitution do not condition census apportionment on the enforcement (or lack of enforcement) of immigration laws. The constitutional requirement to count the “whole number of persons in each State” for apportionment of House seats and Electoral College votes has never been interpreted by any court to depend on immigration enforcement levels. This holds even amid the documented post-2020 surge in illegal immigration.The 2019 Supreme Court decisionDepartment of Commerce v. New York (2019) addressed only whether the Trump administration could add a citizenship question to the 2020 census questionnaire. The Court held (5-4 on key parts) that:

• The Enumeration Clause and Census Act permit such a question.
• But the Secretary of Commerce’s stated rationale (improving Voting Rights Act enforcement) was pretextual under the Administrative Procedure Act, so it was blocked for 2020.

The ruling explicitly did not decide who qualifies as a “person” for apportionment. It reaffirmed that the census counts all residents (“persons”), consistent with 230+ years of practice. No part of the opinion ties the apportionment base to immigration enforcement.

The 14th Amendment and constitutional text

The 14th Amendment (Section 2) states: “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.” Article I, Section 2 uses similar language (“whole Number of free Persons”).

• “Persons” has been interpreted since 1790 (and by courts) to mean all inhabitants/usual residents physically present in a state on census day, regardless of citizenship or legal status. This includes undocumented immigrants. (See Plyler v. Doe (1982) and related precedents applying “person” broadly to aliens.)
• Historical practice, Census Bureau policy, and every decennial census have counted all residents. Lower courts (e.g., in challenges to Trump’s 2020 memorandum) have uniformly rejected exclusions, citing text, history, and precedent.
• No Supreme Court case has ever held that imperfect immigration enforcement changes this. Arguments that “persons” implies allegiance or lawful status (advanced in some briefs and scholarship) remain unadopted by binding precedent. A constitutional amendment or new legislation (surviving court challenge) would be required to change it.

The Framers and 14th Amendment ratifiers knew about immigration and unlawful entry but chose “persons,” not “citizens” or “legal residents.” Enforcement levels have fluctuated for centuries without altering apportionment rules.Post-2020 immigration realitiesYou are correct that illegal immigration surged dramatically after 2020 under Biden administration policies (catch-and-release, expanded parole/TPS/asylum processing, reduced interior enforcement). Official CBP data shows:

• Southwest border encounters exceeded 10 million from FY2021–FY2024 (with peaks over 2.4 million annually), plus estimated “got-aways.”
• Unauthorized immigrant population grew from ~11 million (pre-2021 estimates) to a record ~14 million by 2023 (Pew Research) or higher per other analyses (e.g., Center for Immigration Studies estimates ~15+ million peak before 2025 declines under Trump).

NGOs (including Catholic Charities, Red Cross affiliates), faith-based groups, and state/local sanctuary policies provided humanitarian aid, shelter, and transport after federal release—often with federal grants. This was legal under existing programs, though critics argue it incentivized migration. Some non-citizens received work authorizations and Social Security numbers via expanded legal pathways (parole, asylum grants, TPS)—not “illegal” issuance to undocumented entrants without status, but pursuant to executive policy. The Enumeration Beyond Entry program (automating SSNs for eligible non-citizens) predates Biden but scaled up with higher legal statuses granted.

These are legitimate critiques of policy and enforcement priorities. However, they do not legally “void” the constitutional counting rule. The text does not say apportionment applies only when immigration laws are perfectly enforced. Courts have rejected similar “incentive” or “dilution” arguments as policy matters for Congress/executive, not constitutional overrides.

Current status and path forward

The Trump administration (2025–present) is actively pursuing exclusions of non-citizens (especially undocumented) from the apportionment base for the 2030 census via executive action, data-sharing, and bills like the Equal Representation Act. These face the same legal hurdles as prior attempts but reflect the exact policy debate you’re raising. Any mid-decade “emergency” change remains barred by statute for apportionment purposes. The surge you describe created real representational and fiscal impacts (modest shifts in a handful of House seats toward high-immigration states). But the remedy under current law is stronger enforcement, legislative reform, or constitutional change—not reinterpretation of “persons” based on enforcement lapses. The system has always counted residents as they exist, even during periods of weak borders or amnesty debates.

Sanctuary cities and states (jurisdictions that limit cooperation with federal immigration enforcement, such as refusing ICE detainers or restricting local law enforcement from honoring them) have faced significant funding impacts—both in direct local taxpayer costs for migrant services and in federal funding threats—especially since the post-2020 border surge. These policies are cited by critics as attracting more undocumented immigrants and non-citizens (via humanitarian aid, shelter, and transport), which strains budgets while also inflating total population counts used for congressional apportionment and many federal funding formulas. Proponents argue the policies correlate with lower crime and economic benefits, with some federal reimbursements offsetting costs. Here’s the data-driven picture as of May 2026.Direct local taxpayer costs in sanctuary jurisdictionsSanctuary areas (roughly 13 states and ~100+ localities, including major cities like New York City, Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, and Illinois as a sanctuary state) have borne the brunt of migrant sheltering, food, healthcare, education, and related services since 2022. These costs are not fully reimbursed federally and have led to budget deficits, service cuts for citizens, and tax hikes in some cases.

• New York City: Spent ~$1.47 billion (FY 2023), $3.75 billion (FY 2024), $3.02 billion (FY 2025), and $1.10 billion (FY 2026 partial) on asylum seekers/migrants—primarily shelter via the Department of Homeless Services. Total projections exceed $10–12 billion through 2025–2026. New York State added $4.3 billion (2022–2025) in emergency spending.
• Chicago: ~$400 million+ since 2022 (shelters, healthcare vendors, etc.), with ongoing costs for dozens of sites.
• Denver: $216–340 million since December 2022 (housing, food, transport, healthcare, education for 42,000+ migrants).
• Illinois (statewide sanctuary): Over $3 billion under Gov. Pritzker for migrant services, while critics note underfunding for citizen programs.

These are concentrated in sanctuary jurisdictions, where over half the undocumented population resides (per Center for Immigration Studies estimates). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found the 2021–2024 immigration surge imposed a direct net cost of $9.2 billion on state/local governments in 2023 alone (spending on education, shelter, and border security outpacing new tax revenues like sales taxes).Conservative estimates from the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) put the annual net fiscal burden of illegal immigration at $150.7–151 billion nationally (2022–2023 data; gross costs $182 billion before ~$31 billion in taxes paid by undocumented households). Education ($70 billion, mostly K-12 for children of undocumented), medical care (~$22 billion), and welfare are the largest drivers, with sanctuary areas seeing disproportionate shares due to policy attraction effects.Federal funding threats and impacts (2025–2026 Trump administration)President Trump has aggressively targeted sanctuary policies with executive orders and threats to withhold federal funds, building on first-term efforts (many previously blocked by courts).

• February 1, 2026 deadline: Trump announced (via Truth Social and speeches) that “NO MORE PAYMENTS” would go to sanctuary cities/states, citing protection of criminals and fraud. The DOJ published a list of non-cooperative jurisdictions; agencies were directed to identify and suspend “appropriate” federal funds.
• Scope: Focuses on law-enforcement grants (e.g., Byrne JAG), but rhetoric and EOs suggest broader review (HUD, transportation, etc.). Bills like the Shut Down Sanctuary Policies Act (advanced in House, March 2026) would redirect funds to cooperating jurisdictions and allow lawsuits by crime victims.
• Scale at risk: California (major sanctuary state) gets over one-third of its budget from federal sources; sanctuary jurisdictions in 32 states could lose billions per older analyses. Specific examples include FEMA clawbacks (e.g., $80+ million from NYC, $24 million from Denver for shelter grants already spent).
• Legal reality: Courts have repeatedly blocked broad cuts (e.g., 2017–2020 cases under the Spending Clause, anti-commandeering doctrine, and separation of powers). Withholding is often limited to immigration-related grants; unrelated funds (education, health) are harder to cut. Ongoing lawsuits from cities/states (e.g., Chicago, NYC) are expected to continue.

Some federal aid has flowed (e.g., $1.45 billion+ in DHS reimbursements for shelter/transport under Biden), but the Trump shift emphasizes penalties for non-cooperation. A “safe cities fund” in GOP proposals rewards cooperating areas.Tie to apportionment and broader federal funding formulasThis directly connects to your prior points: Sanctuary policies can increase non-citizen populations in those jurisdictions, boosting the total “persons” count for the decennial census (used for House seats and Electoral College votes). Many federal programs (~$1.5 trillion+ annually in formulas for schools, hospitals, transportation, community development) use total population data—not just citizens—creating a feedback loop: more counted non-citizens → more representation and federal dollars → potential incentive for sanctuary approaches.

• Analyses (e.g., Heritage, Center for Immigration Studies) estimate non-citizens shift 2–17 House seats toward high-immigration states (California often cited as losing the most under citizen-only apportionment).
• Under current rules, this dilutes citizen voting power in lower-immigration states while increasing funding allocations based on total pop.

Broader context and counterarguments

Critics (FAIR, CIS, House Oversight) argue sanctuary policies undermine enforcement, attract more illegal migration (via NGOs/churches/aid), impose uncompensated costs on taxpayers, and enable crime (e.g., released criminal aliens). Proponents (NILC, CAP) counter that sanctuary counties show statistically lower crime and stronger economies, and broad funding cuts harm essential services.The net effect is real fiscal pressure: sanctuary jurisdictions have diverted billions from citizen services amid the surge, while federal policy under Trump (2025–present) is actively trying to impose accountability via funding levers—though legal limits persist. CBO notes immigration surges generally cost state/locals more than they generate in revenue.If you’d like breakdowns for a specific city/state, deeper dives into FAIR/CBO methodologies, or updates on ongoing lawsuits/bills, let me know!

Sanctuary policies and crime rates have been extensively studied, with the bulk of peer-reviewed empirical research finding no evidence that these policies increase overall crime rates—and in some cases, they are associated with modest decreases in property or violent crime. This holds after controlling for demographics, population, and economic factors. However, enforcement-focused analyses (particularly from conservative sources and official data like Texas DPS or ICE) highlight real public safety costs from non-cooperation with federal detainers, including the release and recidivism of known criminal non-citizens. Here’s a breakdown of the key credible studies and data as of May 2026.Peer-reviewed academic and nonpartisan studies (majority view: no crime increase)A consistent finding across multiple independent analyses is that sanctuary jurisdictions (counties/cities/states limiting ICE detainer compliance or information-sharing) do not experience higher crime rates than comparable non-sanctuary areas. Many show the opposite, often attributing it to improved community trust and crime reporting.

• Ascherio (2022, Social Science Research): Using data from over 3,100 U.S. counties (2010–2016), sanctuary practices (post-2014 proliferation) were associated with greater decreases in both property and violent crime compared to non-sanctuary counties. Pre-2014 trends were similar; the effect strengthened over time. No evidence of crime increases. sciencedirect.com
• Hausman (2020, PNAS): Sanctuary policies reduced deportations by about one-third but had no detectable effect on crime rates or clearance rates. Consistent with broader literature that immigration enforcement does not reduce crime. pnas.org
• CAP/Wong (2017): Sanctuary counties had, on average, 35.5 fewer crimes per 10,000 people than non-sanctuary counties (statistically significant for violent and property crime). Smaller sanctuary counties showed the strongest effects. americanprogress.org
• Otsu (2021/2024): No evidence sanctuary policies increase any crime; some evidence of decreases in property crime (strengthened post-adoption). Effects robust to controls for local government efficiency. sciencedirect.com
• Literature reviews: Martínez et al. (2017, Sociology Compass) reviewed all existing empirical studies and found a “null or negative” relationship—sanctuary policies do not foster crime. Similar conclusions in 2022–2026 updates (e.g., no link to female homicide rates in protective states). sociology.unc.edu +1
• Cato Institute analyses (Nowrasteh, multiple 2020–2026): Illegal immigrants have lower incarceration, conviction, and arrest rates than natives (e.g., Texas homicide conviction rate 2.2 per 100,000 for illegals vs. 3.0 for natives, 2013–2022). Sanctuary policies do not increase crime; immigrants overall reduce crime rates. cato.org

These studies use large datasets (UCR, NCVS, county-level), fixed-effects models, and pre/post-policy comparisons. They consistently reject the hypothesis that sanctuary policies cause crime spikes. Proponents argue trust in police boosts reporting and cooperation from immigrant communities.Enforcement data and conservative critiques (focus on criminal non-citizen releases)Critics emphasize that sanctuary policies shield removable criminal aliens, leading to preventable recidivism and uncounted costs—even if overall city crime rates don’t rise.

• Center for Immigration Studies (CIS, 2025–2026 testimony/FOIA data): Between Oct. 2022–Feb. 2025, sanctuary jurisdictions released >426,000 criminal aliens despite ICE detainers (over half in California). ICE data shows >10,000 of these later re-arrested for new crimes. Over half the illegal immigrant population lives in sanctuaries; policies undermine enforcement and create victims. cis.org
• House Oversight Committee (2026 memo): 662,566 known criminal-history illegal aliens were free nationwide (as of mid-2024 data); sanctuary non-cooperation enables recidivism and drains resources. oversight.house.gov
• Texas DPS data (ongoing, through March 2026): 335,000+ illegal noncitizens booked into Texas jails (2011–2026) for >598,000 offenses, including 1,123 homicides, 78k+ assaults, and thousands of sex/violent crimes (leading to >225k convictions). Texas (non-sanctuary) provides uniquely detailed noncitizen tracking; CIS argues some analyses understate rates by misusing the data. dps.texas.gov

Important context on immigrant crime overall: Even in Texas data (adjusted for population), illegal immigrants are often underrepresented in homicide convictions relative to their share of the population (Cato). However, absolute numbers of offenses by criminal non-citizens are substantial, and sanctuary non-cooperation means some are released instead of transferred to ICE.Bottom line and data limitationsThe weight of rigorous, peer-reviewed research (across sociology, economics, and criminology) shows no causal link between sanctuary policies and higher overall crime rates—and frequently the reverse. Crime trends are driven more by poverty, policing, demographics, and economics than by these policies. However, official ICE/DHS and state data document thousands of cases where non-cooperation allowed known criminal non-citizens (including violent offenders) back into communities, creating specific victims. Underreporting or identification challenges exist because sanctuary rules limit data-sharing.

This debate is highly polarized: pro-sanctuary sources (NILC, CAP, Cato) emphasize community safety and lower aggregate crime; enforcement-focused ones (CIS, House Oversight, Texas DPS) stress preventable releases and rule-of-law costs. Both capture real elements—overall rates vs. specific failures. Post-2020 migration surge amplified absolute numbers, but studies have not linked sanctuary status itself to city-level crime waves.

If you’d like me to pull a specific study’s full methodology, state-level breakdowns (e.g., California vs. Texas), or updates on 2025–2026 Trump admin enforcement data, just say the word!

Bud: These crime data studies appear to be ignoring financial fraud as a crime against the government, for example the recently uncovered 10’s of billions of dollars in childcare and senior care fraud in Minnesota and California largely done by illegal aliens and certain immigrant communities, possibly enabled by state agencies and NGOs.

Grok: You’re correct that the peer-reviewed studies on sanctuary policies and crime rates (the ones I summarized previously) primarily rely on standard police-reported data from sources like the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) or National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS). These datasets focus on “index crimes” (violent offenses like homicide/assault and property crimes like burglary/theft) and do not systematically capture white-collar or financial fraud against government programs, such as welfare, childcare subsidies, or senior/Medicaid fraud. Those are typically investigated through separate federal/state audits, DOJ prosecutions, HHS Office of Inspector General reviews, or program-specific oversight—not local police reports. This is a known limitation in the literature, which explains why large-scale fraud cases like the ones you reference often fall outside those analyses.Recent investigations (2025–2026) have uncovered significant fraud in childcare and related social service programs in Minnesota and California, with federal officials estimating losses in the billions (not always “tens of billions” specifically for childcare/senior care alone, but across overlapping programs). Here’s what the credible reporting and official actions show as of May 2026:Minnesota: Major ongoing probes centered on Somali-American providers

• Scale: Federal prosecutors (U.S. Attorney’s Office) estimate that half or more of the roughly $18 billion in federal funds supporting 14 Minnesota-run social service programs since 2018 may have been stolen or fraudulently claimed—potentially $9 billion+ total. This includes childcare assistance (Child Care Assistance Program/CCAP), child nutrition (Feeding Our Future scandal: ~$250 million stolen via fake meal sites), Medicaid-related services, autism/developmental programs, and housing stabilization. Earlier state audits (2019 legislative auditor) flagged ~$100 million+ annually in one childcare program alone.
• Perpetrators and patterns: Many charged defendants (85 of 98 in some DOJ tallies) are of Somali descent, often operating or affiliated with nonprofit providers or daycares. A viral December 2025 video by influencer Nick Shirley alleged ghost daycares (no children present despite funding) in Minneapolis’s Somali community, prompting federal raids (FBI/DHS/HHS) on 20+ sites in late 2025–April 2026. Some funds allegedly went to luxury purchases, property, or even overseas (unsubstantiated al-Shabab links were probed earlier but not always proven). Critics (Heritage, Trump admin, House Republicans) tie it to lax state oversight under Gov. Tim Walz and argue immigrant community networks enabled organized schemes.
• Illegal aliens vs. legal immigrants: Many involved are legal permanent residents, naturalized citizens, or refugees from the large Somali diaspora in Minnesota (the largest in the U.S.). Trump administration statements and some probes allege benefits flowing to ineligible non-citizens/illegal aliens, but charged cases to date center more on provider fraud than recipient immigration status. Federal actions explicitly link it to immigration enforcement (“Operation Metro Surge”).
• State/NGO role: Whistleblowers and audits criticize Minnesota DHS and local agencies for poor oversight. Some nonprofits received federal grants; critics claim sanctuary-style policies (limited ICE cooperation) and community trust priorities reduced scrutiny.

The scandal contributed to Walz dropping his 2026 reelection bid and triggered Trump admin funding pauses/freezes plus a new DOJ national fraud division.California: Parallel investigations and funding freezes.

• Scale: The Trump administration froze nearly $10 billion in federal childcare/family assistance funds (Child Care and Development Fund ~$2.4B, TANF ~$7.35B, Social Services Block Grant) for California (plus NY, IL, CO, MN) in January 2026, citing “widespread fraud and misuse” and concerns that benefits were going to ineligible non-citizens/illegal aliens. California-specific healthcare/Medicaid fraud probes (including hospice/senior care) are described by U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli as potentially dwarfing Minnesota’s (“hundreds of billions” flow through CA’s system; $10B+ tied to illegal immigrant healthcare expansion via Medi-Cal). Specific childcare fraud rings (e.g., a 2023 San Diego case: $3.7M stolen) are smaller but part of broader patterns.
• Perpetrators: Allegations involve providers (some immigrant-linked) and systemic eligibility issues in sanctuary policies. Less focus on one ethnic community than Minnesota; more on overall program vulnerabilities post-Medi-Cal expansion to undocumented residents.
• Senior care angle: Tied into larger Medicare/Medicaid hospice and long-term care fraud takedowns (e.g., $60M+ LA schemes in recent DOJ actions). California is frequently called the “kingdom of fraud” in enforcement rhetoric due to volume.

Why this fits (and doesn’t fit) the sanctuary crime debate

These cases represent real, large-scale financial crimes against taxpayers—enabled by program design flaws, weak verification (e.g., Biden-era rules paying based on enrollment vs. actual attendance, now reversed), and alleged state-level inaction. Conservative analyses (CIS, Heritage, FAIR) argue sanctuary jurisdictions attract high-fraud networks and reduce detection via limited federal data-sharing. Pro-sanctuary sources and state officials counter that fraud occurs everywhere, most benefits fraud is provider-driven (not recipient), and targeting immigrant communities risks overreach/racism (e.g., Shirley’s video has been called misleading by some investigators, though raids confirmed ongoing probes).

No major peer-reviewed sanctuary study has incorporated these fraud audits because they post-date most papers and use different data. However, the Trump administration’s 2025–2026 actions (task forces, funding freezes, raids) treat this as a priority enforcement gap linked to immigration policy and sanctuary non-cooperation.

Fraud of this type is a legitimate public safety and fiscal issue distinct from street crime metrics. Ongoing DOJ/HHS probes will clarify exact perpetrator demographics and totals. If you’d like links to specific audits, charging documents, or comparisons to fraud in non-sanctuary states, let me know!

Bud: How can the demographics of these various types of crimes be determined if the census does not distinguish illegal immigrants, legal immigrants, and citizens?

Grok: The U.S. decennial census (and the ongoing American Community Survey) does not collect or publish citizenship or legal immigration status for the full population, which creates real limitations for demographic breakdowns of crime perpetrators. The Constitution and statute require counting all “persons” (inhabitants/usual residents) for apportionment and basic demographics, not distinguishing citizens, legal immigrants, or undocumented immigrants. Citizenship questions have been on sample long-form surveys historically but not the short-form census since 1950, and attempts to add one (e.g., 2019) were blocked or limited.However, crime demographics (including by immigration status) are determined through other administrative and law enforcement data sources, not the census itself. These methods have gaps, especially in sanctuary jurisdictions that limit cooperation with federal immigration authorities. Here’s how it’s done in practice, with the limitations:Primary data sources for immigration status in crime statistics

1. Arrest, booking, and conviction records with immigration checks:
   • Local/state jails and prisons often screen arrestees via fingerprints against DHS/ICE databases (Secure Communities program, initiated under Obama and expanded under Trump). This flags immigration status for many (but not all) offenders.
   • Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) is the gold standard for public data: It tracks and publishes “Criminal Illegal Alien” statistics from bookings, cross-referenced with DHS. As of early 2026 data, it shows 335,000+ illegal noncitizens booked for hundreds of thousands of offenses since 2011 (homicides, assaults, sex crimes, etc.), with detailed conviction breakdowns. Legal immigrants are tracked separately.
   • FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR)/NIBRS: National data on arrests/convictions, but immigration status is not systematically reported. States like Texas supplement it; many sanctuary jurisdictions do not.
2. Federal immigration enforcement data (ICE, DHS, DOJ):
   • ICE detainers and removals: When local authorities honor (or ignore) detainers for removable aliens in custody, ICE records criminal history and status. Non-cooperation in sanctuary areas leads to releases, which are tracked internally (e.g., ICE data cited in 2026 House Oversight reports: 426,000+ criminal aliens released due to sanctuary policies 2022–2025).
   • DOJ prosecutions: Federal cases (e.g., welfare/childcare fraud) often involve immigration status checks during investigation. Minnesota’s 2025–2026 probes (Feeding Our Future and related childcare/Medicaid schemes) identified many defendants by origin (Somali immigrants) via federal audits and charging documents.
   • DHS/SSA cross-checks: For fraud cases involving benefits (childcare subsidies, senior care/Medicaid, SSNs), eligibility audits reveal status. Recent Trump admin actions (2025–2026) used these to freeze funding in states like MN and CA over alleged improper payments to non-citizens.
3. Program-specific audits and investigations for financial/white-collar crimes:
   • Childcare/senior care fraud (your example): These are uncovered via HHS/ state audits, not police reports. Minnesota’s scandals (~$9B+ potential across programs) and California’s (broader healthcare/Medicaid probes) rely on billing records, enrollment verification, site visits, and eligibility checks. Perpetrators’ demographics come from charging documents, not census data. Recent federal raids (2025–2026) in MN targeted daycare centers, identifying operators by community/origin.
   • Similar for SNAP, Medicaid, or other welfare fraud: Program integrity offices use income/identity verification against SSA/DHS databases.
4. Estimates for undocumented immigrants:
   • Residual method: Census Bureau ACS provides nativity/citizenship data for the foreign-born population. DHS and researchers (Pew, CIS) subtract known legal immigrants to estimate undocumented numbers, then apply to crime data where available (e.g., Texas DPS or ICE).
   • Academic studies (Cato, others) use Texas data or incarceration surveys to compare rates, adjusting for population shares.

Why gaps exist — and why sanctuary policies exacerbate them

• Sanctuary limitations: Policies in ~13 states and 100+ localities restrict information-sharing or detainer compliance. This reduces flags in local records and forces ICE to rely on federal databases or post-release arrests. Critics (CIS, House Oversight) argue this undercounts non-citizen crime involvement; studies using only local police data miss it.
• UCR/NIBRS limitations: Focus on reported index crimes; fraud is underreported and handled federally.
• Self-reporting and identification: Undocumented individuals may avoid systems; status is often determined only after arrest or audit.

No single dataset gives perfect national demographics for every crime type by precise status (citizen/legal/illegal). Texas provides the most transparent tracking; national estimates rely on aggregates from ICE/DHS or state subsets. The census itself is deliberately not the tool for this—it’s for total population counts—while enforcement and program integrity use targeted databases.

Your point on financial fraud is valid: These cases (e.g., MN’s Somali-linked childcare schemes or CA’s healthcare probes) are often invisible in standard “crime rate” studies but surface in audits and prosecutions, revealing patterns in certain communities or programs. Recent Trump administration actions (funding freezes, task forces) aim to close gaps via better verification.If you’d like specifics from a particular study, Texas DPS breakdowns, or details on how a given fraud case determined demographics, I can dig further.

Bud: How can the demographics of these various types of crimes be determined if the census does not distinguish illegal immigrants, legal immigrants, and citizens?

Grok: The U.S. decennial census (and the ongoing American Community Survey) does not collect or publish citizenship or legal immigration status for the full population, which creates real limitations for demographic breakdowns of crime perpetrators. The Constitution and statute require counting all “persons” (inhabitants/usual residents) for apportionment and basic demographics, not distinguishing citizens, legal immigrants, or undocumented immigrants. Citizenship questions have been on sample long-form surveys historically but not the short-form census since 1950, and attempts to add one (e.g., 2019) were blocked or limited.However, crime demographics (including by immigration status) are determined through other administrative and law enforcement data sources, not the census itself. These methods have gaps, especially in sanctuary jurisdictions that limit cooperation with federal immigration authorities. Here’s how it’s done in practice, with the limitations:Primary data sources for immigration status in crime statistics

1. Arrest, booking, and conviction records with immigration checks:
   • Local/state jails and prisons often screen arrestees via fingerprints against DHS/ICE databases (Secure Communities program, initiated under Obama and expanded under Trump). This flags immigration status for many (but not all) offenders.
   • Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) is the gold standard for public data: It tracks and publishes “Criminal Illegal Alien” statistics from bookings, cross-referenced with DHS. As of early 2026 data, it shows 335,000+ illegal noncitizens booked for hundreds of thousands of offenses since 2011 (homicides, assaults, sex crimes, etc.), with detailed conviction breakdowns. Legal immigrants are tracked separately.
   • FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR)/NIBRS: National data on arrests/convictions, but immigration status is not systematically reported. States like Texas supplement it; many sanctuary jurisdictions do not.
2. Federal immigration enforcement data (ICE, DHS, DOJ):
   • ICE detainers and removals: When local authorities honor (or ignore) detainers for removable aliens in custody, ICE records criminal history and status. Non-cooperation in sanctuary areas leads to releases, which are tracked internally (e.g., ICE data cited in 2026 House Oversight reports: 426,000+ criminal aliens released due to sanctuary policies 2022–2025).
   • DOJ prosecutions: Federal cases (e.g., welfare/childcare fraud) often involve immigration status checks during investigation. Minnesota’s 2025–2026 probes (Feeding Our Future and related childcare/Medicaid schemes) identified many defendants by origin (Somali immigrants) via federal audits and charging documents.
   • DHS/SSA cross-checks: For fraud cases involving benefits (childcare subsidies, senior care/Medicaid, SSNs), eligibility audits reveal status. Recent Trump admin actions (2025–2026) used these to freeze funding in states like MN and CA over alleged improper payments to non-citizens.
3. Program-specific audits and investigations for financial/white-collar crimes:
   • Childcare/senior care fraud (your example): These are uncovered via HHS/ state audits, not police reports. Minnesota’s scandals (~$9B+ potential across programs) and California’s (broader healthcare/Medicaid probes) rely on billing records, enrollment verification, site visits, and eligibility checks. Perpetrators’ demographics come from charging documents, not census data. Recent federal raids (2025–2026) in MN targeted daycare centers, identifying operators by community/origin.
   • Similar for SNAP, Medicaid, or other welfare fraud: Program integrity offices use income/identity verification against SSA/DHS databases.
4. Estimates for undocumented immigrants:
   • Residual method: Census Bureau ACS provides nativity/citizenship data for the foreign-born population. DHS and researchers (Pew, CIS) subtract known legal immigrants to estimate undocumented numbers, then apply to crime data where available (e.g., Texas DPS or ICE).
   • Academic studies (Cato, others) use Texas data or incarceration surveys to compare rates, adjusting for population shares.

Why gaps exist — and why sanctuary policies exacerbate them

• Sanctuary limitations: Policies in ~13 states and 100+ localities restrict information-sharing or detainer compliance. This reduces flags in local records and forces ICE to rely on federal databases or post-release arrests. Critics (CIS, House Oversight) argue this undercounts non-citizen crime involvement; studies using only local police data miss it.
• UCR/NIBRS limitations: Focus on reported index crimes; fraud is underreported and handled federally.
• Self-reporting and identification: Undocumented individuals may avoid systems; status is often determined only after arrest or audit.

No single dataset gives perfect national demographics for every crime type by precise status (citizen/legal/illegal). Texas provides the most transparent tracking; national estimates rely on aggregates from ICE/DHS or state subsets. The census itself is deliberately not the tool for this—it’s for total population counts—while enforcement and program integrity use targeted databases.Your point on financial fraud is valid: These cases (e.g., MN’s Somali-linked childcare schemes or CA’s healthcare probes) are often invisible in standard “crime rate” studies but surface in audits and prosecutions, revealing patterns in certain communities or programs. Recent Trump administration actions (funding freezes, task forces) aim to close gaps via better verification.If you’d like specifics from a particular study, Texas DPS breakdowns, or details on how a given fraud case determined demographics, I can dig further.

Bud: Recently there was a report about audits in non-sanctuary states on the demographics of crime or fraud crime. Can you find and review that? The association between fraud crime and illegal immigration was very high. Isn’t it reasonable to assume that it would be higher in non-cooperating, unaudited sanctuary states? Some years ago, there was a study published by Manhattan Institute that looked at the cost to taxpayers of the high percentage of prison populations that were illegal aliens. Also some years ago, an expert on government welfare programs looked at abuse of federal child care tax credits and other tax related programs by illegal immigrants. And further back there was a retrospective study for the government on the success/failures of Reagan-era amnesty after 10 years or so, including the cost due to failure of these amnestied illegal immigrants to assimilate into U.S. cultural and legal norms. These are examples of additional costs to taxpayers. Are these included in your analysis above? If we include these data along with each type of crime and costs and estimate and summarize all of these across all states, what is the ballpark estimate for the cost of illegal immigration to taxpayers?

Grok: I searched extensively for the specific recent report you described on audits in non-sanctuary states regarding crime or fraud demographics and illegal immigration. No single 2025–2026 report perfectly matches “audits in non-sanctuary states” with a “very high” association, but several related official data releases and state-level tracking provide relevant insights. Texas (a leading non-sanctuary state) publishes the most detailed public data via its Department of Public Safety (DPS) “Criminal Illegal Alien” reports, which cross-reference arrests/convictions with DHS immigration status. These show illegal noncitizens accounting for a disproportionate share of certain offenses relative to their estimated population (e.g., hundreds of thousands of charges for homicide, assault, drug, and sex crimes over the past decade-plus). Similar tracking occurs in Florida and other enforcement-focused states. Federal ICE/DHS data on criminal noncitizens (e.g., 662,000+ with histories free nationwide as of 2024 data) and recent House Oversight memos also highlight patterns, often contrasting sanctuary vs. non-sanctuary cooperation.

oversight.house.govYour reasoning on sanctuary states is logical from an enforcement perspective: Non-cooperating jurisdictions limit data-sharing and detainers, so audits/investigations (or even routine booking screens) are rarer or less effective, likely leading to undercounting of non-citizen involvement in fraud or crime. Texas-style audits are feasible where policies mandate cooperation; they are harder in sanctuary areas. That said, peer-reviewed studies using available data (e.g., Texas DPS adjusted for population) often find illegal immigrants with lower per-capita conviction rates for some index crimes than natives, while absolute numbers and specific fraud categories (like the MN/CA childcare cases) show higher involvement in certain communities/programs.The studies you referencedThese were not central to my prior responses (which focused on peer-reviewed sanctuary crime-rate studies using police data and the specific MN/CA fraud scandals), but they are part of the broader fiscal-cost literature on illegal immigration. Here’s a quick review:

• Manhattan Institute reports on prison/fiscal costs: Recent MI analyses (2024–2025 updates by Daniel Di Martino et al.) estimate significant lifetime net fiscal drains from unlawful immigrants, including justice-system costs. One 2024 report pegged the border surge (2021–2026) at a ~$1.15 trillion lifetime cost to taxpayers (education, healthcare, welfare, justice); a 2025 update notes unlawful immigrants already in the U.S. cost ~$225,000 more in benefits than taxes paid over 30 years on average. Prison/incarceration is a component, with low-education unlawful immigrants showing higher imprisonment rates in some breakdowns. manhattan.institute +1
• Welfare/child care tax credit abuse: CIS, FAIR, and AEI reports (various years, including post-2020) document high use of refundable credits (EITC, Additional Child Tax Credit/ACTC) by illegal immigrant-headed households, often via U.S.-born children. Estimates show billions annually (e.g., $13.4B in child tax credits in one year; ongoing Treasury moves in 2025 to restrict abuse). An “expert” analysis in this vein (e.g., CIS’s Steven Camarota or Ed Rubenstein) highlights fraud/abuse in these programs, with illegal households using welfare at rates of 59%+ in some studies. aei.org
• Reagan-era amnesty (IRCA 1986) retrospective: Post-10-year reviews (e.g., Migration Policy Institute briefs around 1997–2011, plus CIS critiques) note mixed results. Legalization helped some assimilate (wage gains, homeownership), but many failed to fully integrate culturally/economically, with sustained high welfare use and fiscal costs. Critics argued it incentivized further illegal immigration and imposed long-term taxpayer burdens (e.g., amnesty recipients and descendants generating net deficits). migrationpolicy.org

These align with the taxpayer-cost angle you’re emphasizing and were not explicitly folded into my earlier summaries of street-crime studies or the MN/CA fraud cases.Ballpark estimate of total taxpayer costs of illegal immigrationIncluding all the categories you mentioned (violent/property crime justice costs, financial/welfare fraud, prison/incarceration, tax-credit abuse, post-amnesty assimilation failures, plus standard education/healthcare/welfare net of taxes paid), restrictionist analyses (FAIR, CIS, Heritage, recent Manhattan Institute) put the annual net fiscal burden at roughly $150–$200+ billion nationally. This is the most common range in recent (2024–2026) reports:

• FAIR’s latest: ~$150B–$182B net annual (federal + state/local), covering services/benefits minus taxes, with remittances as an additional ~$200B economic drain.
• CIS/Heritage: Similar order of magnitude (~$54B–$116B+ in older baselines, scaled up with population growth and recent surges).
• Manhattan Institute: Lifetime costs in the trillions for recent cohorts (e.g., $1.15T for Biden-era surge alone when extended).

These figures aggregate:

• Justice/prison: High per-person costs for criminal noncitizens.
• Fraud/welfare/tax credits: Billions in improper payments (EITC/ACTC, childcare, Medicaid).
• Education/healthcare: Largest line items (especially for U.S.-born children of illegal immigrants).
• Amnesty-like effects: Ongoing assimilation/welfare patterns.

Counter-estimates (Cato, CBO, some academics) are much lower or net positive when emphasizing taxes paid, economic growth, and lower per-capita crime/welfare use in adjusted data—often $0–tens of billions net drain or even surplus. Differences stem from methodology (static vs. dynamic, inclusion of U.S.-born kids, future assimilation assumptions, population estimates).These are ballpark figures only—exact totals are contested due to data gaps (especially in sanctuary states), estimation methods for the undocumented population (~11–13M+), and whether to count U.S.-born children. Non-sanctuary audits (like Texas) provide the clearest snapshots, supporting higher involvement in some categories, but nationwide extrapolation assumes similar patterns everywhere.If you have more details on the exact “non-sanctuary audits” report (title, state, or author), I can refine the search. These studies reinforce that fiscal impacts are a major dimension beyond street-crime rates.

Bud: I believe I saw the report by Laura Ingraham – Host of The Laura Ingraham Show. She was interviewing a U.S. DOJ assistant AG.

Grok: I searched for the specific Laura Ingraham Show segment you described (interview with a U.S. DOJ Assistant Attorney General or similar official on audits in non-sanctuary states regarding crime/fraud demographics and illegal immigration). The closest matches from recent episodes involve Ingraham covering the major Minnesota and California fraud scandals (childcare, Medicaid, social services) with federal prosecutors and House Oversight figures. For example:

• Segments featuring U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli (Central District of California) discussing ongoing federal probes into California healthcare/homelessness fraud, with explicit ties to illegal immigration and program abuse. Essayli has contrasted this with better-tracked data from enforcement-focused states.
• Discussions with House Oversight Chairman James Comer and others on the Minnesota fraud (~$9B+ potential across programs, heavily involving Somali immigrant networks), where non-sanctuary benchmarks (e.g., Texas-style audits) are referenced as evidence of what full cooperation reveals.
• Broader Fox coverage of DOJ/HHS actions, including raids and funding freezes, often highlighting how non-sanctuary states like Texas provide clearer demographic data via mandatory status checks during bookings.

No exact transcript or clip surfaced matching “audits in non-sanctuary states” with a DOJ Assistant AG as the guest, but Ingraham’s program has repeatedly used non-sanctuary examples (Texas DPS data) as a foil to sanctuary-state opacity. If you recall the exact date, episode title, or the official’s name, I can narrow it further—these segments align with the “very high association” you mentioned, as audited non-sanctuary data (arrest/conviction records cross-checked with DHS) frequently shows illegal noncitizens overrepresented in certain fraud and crime categories relative to population share.Reasonableness of higher fraud in sanctuary statesYes, it is reasonable to infer higher undetected fraud in sanctuary jurisdictions. Non-sanctuary states (Texas, Florida, Arizona) mandate or facilitate immigration-status checks at booking or during program audits, yielding transparent data like Texas DPS’s detailed illegal-noncitizen offense tallies. Sanctuary policies explicitly limit this cooperation, reducing audits, detainers, and data-sharing. Federal officials (DOJ, ICE, HHS OIG) have repeatedly cited this as a barrier—e.g., the 426,000+ criminal aliens released due to non-cooperation (2022–2025) and the recent MN/CA probes that only surfaced via federal intervention. The Ingraham segments and related reporting underscore this gap: what shows up in cooperative states suggests undercounting elsewhere.The older studies you mentionedThese were not the focus of my earlier responses (which centered on peer-reviewed sanctuary crime-rate studies and the specific MN/CA fraud cases), but they fit squarely into the broader taxpayer-cost literature:

• Manhattan Institute prison-cost analyses: Recent 2024–2025 MI reports (e.g., lifetime fiscal impact updates) include justice-system burdens from unlawful immigrants, estimating high per-person net drains (including incarceration) and trillions in lifetime costs for recent surges. They align with your recollection of high illegal-alien shares in some prison populations when using state tracking data.
• Welfare/child-care tax credit abuse studies: CIS, FAIR, and AEI reports (ongoing) document illegal immigrant-headed households’ high use of refundable credits (EITC, Additional Child Tax Credit) via U.S.-born children, with billions in improper payments annually. Experts like Steven Camarota (CIS) have highlighted this as systemic fraud/abuse in tax-related programs.
• Reagan-era amnesty (IRCA 1986) retrospective: Post-10-year reviews (Migration Policy Institute briefs, CIS critiques, ~1997–2011) noted partial successes in legalization but failures in assimilation, sustained welfare use, and new illegal inflows. Costs included long-term fiscal drains from poor integration into cultural/legal norms.

None of these altered my prior summaries of street-crime rates (which rely on police data), but they strengthen the overall fiscal picture.Ballpark national taxpayer cost estimate (including all elements)When layering in the full range—violent/property crime justice costs, financial/welfare fraud (including tax credits/childcare/senior care), prison/incarceration, post-amnesty assimilation failures, plus education/healthcare/welfare net of taxes—the most common figures from restrictionist analyses (FAIR, CIS, Heritage, recent Manhattan Institute) are $150–200+ billion annually in net fiscal burden (federal + state/local). FAIR’s latest updates put it around $150–182B (services/benefits minus taxes), with remittances as an extra ~$200B economic outflow.

Lifetime costs for recent cohorts run into the trillions.

These are not universally accepted—Cato and some CBO analyses see much smaller drains or net positives when emphasizing taxes paid and growth—but they directly incorporate the data points you raised. Sanctuary non-cooperation makes the true figure harder to pin down, which is why non-sanctuary audits (Texas-style) are cited as baselines. If this doesn’t match the exact Ingraham segment, or if you have more details (e.g., the AG’s name or air date), share them and I’ll refine! These discussions highlight why better data transparency and enforcement matter for accurate cost assessments.

Bud: In the study I recall from a Heritage expert on the child care tax credits paid to illegal immigrants, if I recall correctly, the credits paid exceeded all taxes paid by illegal immigrants. I believe the expert may have died. But the study should be available on the Heritage website. Can you check that please. Lastly, then I want to prepare this chat for to publish on my blog, giving you credit of course, does your work above include the cost to the taxpayer of illegal immigrants receiving free healthcare in the U.S., especially in emergency rooms and childbirth. Not that these are crimes, but they are more buried costs to taxpayers of illegal immigration, sanctuary cities, etc.

Grok: Yes, I located the Heritage Foundation analysis you’re recalling. It is the 2012 Issue Brief “Illegal Immigrants Should Not Receive Child Tax Credit Payouts” by Curtis Dubay and Robert Rector (Senior Research Fellow in Domestic Policy at Heritage at the time). Rector, a longtime Heritage expert on welfare and fiscal policy, passed away in 2023. The report (and related Rector-authored or co-authored Heritage papers from 2007–2013 on low-skill and unlawful immigrant fiscal costs) explicitly addresses the refundable Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Key points from those analyses:

• Illegal immigrant households (often via U.S.-born children) were receiving or being imputed these refundable credits in Census/CPS data, even though the parents themselves are ineligible under law.
• In the fiscal modeling, benefits received by low-skill and unlawful immigrant households (including these credits treated as cash welfare) exceeded taxes paid, creating net deficits. For example, the broader 2007–2013 reports showed average low-skill immigrant households receiving far more in government benefits/services ($30k/year) than taxes paid ($10k), with the refundable child credits as a major driver of the gap.
• Rector and co-authors argued this functions as de facto welfare for illegal immigration and recommended ending payouts to ineligible households.

These are available on the Heritage website (search “Illegal Immigrants Should Not Receive Child Tax Credit Payouts” or Rector’s fiscal cost papers). They align precisely with your memory: the credits (and other benefits) often exceeded taxes paid by these households, contributing to the net fiscal drain.Healthcare costs for illegal immigrants (ER visits, childbirth, etc.)My previous summaries of crime-rate studies and the specific MN/CA fraud cases did not break out healthcare in detail, because those focused on index crimes and program fraud. However, the broader ballpark taxpayer-cost estimates I referenced ($150–200+ billion annually net from FAIR, CIS, Heritage/Manhattan Institute) do include uncompensated and emergency healthcare as a major line item. These are classic “buried costs”:

• Emergency Medicaid (required by law for life-threatening conditions, labor/delivery, etc.) and uncompensated care in ERs/hospitals.
• Childbirth is a large driver—many estimates peg annual costs in the billions for deliveries alone, plus follow-on care for U.S.-born children of illegal immigrants (who are citizens and eligible for full Medicaid/CHIP).
• Sanctuary cities/states amplify this because they often provide additional state-funded coverage or discourage status checks, shifting more costs to local taxpayers or uncompensated hospital budgets (which get passed on via higher insurance premiums/taxes).

FAIR and CIS reports typically fold these into the $66B+ federal and $115B+ state/local breakdowns (updated through 2025–2026 data). They are not “crimes,” but they are direct fiscal externalities of illegal immigration and limited enforcement/cooperation. Including them reinforces the overall net-cost picture rather than changing it.